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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
THE BOTTOM LINE DEFENSE IN TITLE VII ACTIONS:
SUPREME COURT REJECTION IN CONNECTICUT V
TEAL AND A MODIFIED APPROACH
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits employers from
discriminating against job applicants or employees on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 The statute proscribes both in-
tentional discrimination and facially neutral selection devices that dis-
proportionately exclude members of minority groups from certain jobs
and are unrelated to job performance. Proponents of the "bottom line
defense" argue that even where the plaintiff proves that a particular step
in the hiring or promotion process disparately affects minorities, title
VfI is not violated if the employer demonstrates that the result of the
entire selection process, the bottom line, is nondiscriminatory.
The Supreme Court recently rejected the bottom line defense in
Connecticut v. Teal 3 This Note examines that decision and proposes a
modified bottom line defense, an approach that is more consistent with
the aims of title VII.
I
BACKGROUND
For the first seven years after Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, courts applied title VII only to intentional acts of discrimination.
In such cases the plaintiff must prove that the employer has barred him
from employment or promotion because he is a member of a protected
class; proof of the employer's illegal motive is essential to the claim.
Courts may infer illegal motive from the employer's "disparate treat-
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2 Section 703(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
3 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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ment" of the plaintiff.4
In 1971 the Supreme Court, in Gr'ggs v. Duke Power Co., 5 expanded
the scope of title VII to include a class of cases in which proof of the
employer's discriminatory intent is absent. In Griggs, black employees at
the defendant's generating plant brought an action challenging the
company's policy that required all applicants for "desirable" 6 positions
to pass two intelligence tests and possess a high school diploma. 7 These
requirements, which did not measure an applicant's ability to perform
any particular job, excluded a disproportionate number of blacks from
the desirable jobs.8
The defendant prevailed in both the district court9 and court of
appeals' 0 because the plaintiffs failed to prove intentional discrimina-
tion by the employer." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a
title VII plaintiff can establish a prima facie case without showing dis-
criminatory intent if an employer's selection process excludes a dispro-
portionate number of black applicants. 12 The Court concluded that
title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. . . . If an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."'13
The Griggs Court thus established a new type of title VII action, the
4 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To establish a prima
facie disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
Id at 802.
5 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generaly Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implica-
tionse for P'oate and Pub/ic Employers, 50 TEx. L. REv. 901 (1972); Blumrosen, Strangers in Para-
dise: Griggs v. Duke Power Company and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L.
REv. 59 (1972).
6 Cnggs, 401 U.S. at 428. The plant was divided into five departments: (1) labor,
(2) coal handling, (3) operations, (4) maintenance, and (5) laboratory and testing., Applicants
for positions in all departments except labor had to meet the test and diploma requirements.
Incumbent employees could transfer from labor or coal handling to the other three depart-
ments by passing the two tests, even if they did not have a high school diploma. Id at 427.
7 These requirements were facially neutral because they did not refer to the applicant's
race.
8 401 U.S. at 430 n.6. The Court cited U.S. Bureau of the Census statistics showing
that in North Carolina, 34% of white males but only 12% of black males had completed high
school. The Court noted that the EEOC in one case had found that 58% of whites but only
6% of blacks passed the two tests given by the company.
9 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
10 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
'' Id at 1232. Prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the company openly
discriminated on the basis of race. Gngs, 401 U.S. at 424.
12 401 U.S. at 436.
13 Id at 431.
1983] BO7TOM LINE DEFENSE
"disparate impact"'4 claim. In Griggs and subsequent disparate impact
cases,' 5 the Court developed a test for assessing such claims. To estab-
lish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an employer's
facially neutral selection device excludes a disproportionate number 16 of
members of the plaintiff's protected class from employment or promo-
tion.17 If the plaintiff proves disparate impact, the employer must show
that the selection device is "job related."' 81 Even if the defendant dem-
14 Some courts and commentators refer to this as "adverse impact." See generally Blum-
rosen, supra note 5.
15 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975). Dothard involved the validity under title VII of an Alabama statute requir-
ing that all guards in male prisons meet minimum height and weight standards. The Court
determined that the statute had a disparate impact on women because although 99% of all
men met the minimum requirements, only 58% of women qualified. The defendant pre-
vailed, however, because the Court held that sex was a "bona fide occupational qualification"
due to problems associated with having women in male prisons. The requirements, therefore,
were protected under § 703(e) of title VII. See 433 U.S. at 332-37.
In Albemarle, the employer required that applicants for skilled jobs have a high school
diploma and pass two intelligence tests. The Court reaffirmed the Griggs disparate impact
principle and held that the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving disparate impact. The
Court also rejected the employer's position that the requirements were job related. See 422
U.S. at 436.
16 The courts have not clearly defined the degree of disparity the plaintiff must prove.
See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 35 (Supp. 1979) (dis-
cussing approaches of various courts); see also incfa note 35 (discussing "80% rule" of Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures).
17 There are at least three ways to establish disparate impact. The plaintiff may demon-
strate that:
(1) the employer's selection device disparately affects actual applicants who
are members of the plaintiff's protected group. See, e.g., New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979);
(2) the selection device discriminates against potential applicants from the
plaintiff's class. This approach is premised on the realization that the em-
ployer's selection device may have a disparate impact not only upon actual
job applicants, but also upon potential applicants who are aware of, but do
not meet, the employer's criteria, and thus do not even apply. See, e.g.,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); cf Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. at 430 n.6 (observing that high school diploma requirement disparately
affects blacks because percentage of blacks graduating from high school was
much lower than comparable figure for whites);
(3) the percentage of his class in the employer's work force is significantly
less than its percentage in the area population. See, e.g., Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
The defendant also may use these methods to disprove disparate impact claims. See, e.g.,
id at 308-10; see also Shoben, Diferential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 793 (1978). See generaly 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION§ 74.41 (1982); Note, Employment Discrimination: Plaintif's Trina Facie Case and Defendant's Rebut-
tal in a Disparate Impact Case, 54 TUL. L. REv. 1187 (1980).
18 401 U.S. at 431. See id at 432 ('[A]ny given [employment] requirement must have a
manifest relationship to the employment in question."). In discussing job relatedness, the
Court in Griggs also stated that "[t]he touchstone is business necessity," id. at 431, thus sug-
gesting that an employer can only rely on a selection device having a disparate impact if it is
necessary to his business. Subsequent decisions, however, have focused almost exclusively on
job relatedness. See 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 17, at § 72.14.
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onstrates job relatedness, the plaintiff can still prevail by showing "that
other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial
effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient
and trustworthy workmanship.' "19
Some employers have tried to defeat disparate impact claims with a
"bottom line defense." The bottom line defense is applicable when one
step in a multistep hiring or promotion process has a disparate impact
on a protected class but the overall process is nondiscriminatory. For
example, an employer might require applicants for a certain position to
be right-handed. 20 Assume this requirement excludes a disproportion-
ate number of blacks because a higher percentage of blacks than whites
are left-handed. The employer, however, actually hires enough right-
handed blacks to eliminate any disparate impact, thus achieving a non-
discriminatory bottom line despite using a preliminary selection device
that had a disparate impact. Employers have argued that selection
processes that achieve equitable results--i.e., that attain a nondiscrimi-
natory bottom line-bar disparate impact actions,2' either by prevent-
ing plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case or by operating as an
affirmative defense.
Until 1982, the bottom line concept received judicial and adminis-
trative acceptance.2 2 Most lower courts that considered the issue held
that a nondiscriminatory bottom line is an absolute defense to a dispa-
rate impact claim.23 In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC),24 the federal agency charged with enforcing title
19 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
20 This is a facially neutral selection criterion because it does not refer to race. In this
example, also assume that the employer cannot rely on the job relatedness defense because
being right-handed is unrelated to job performance.
21 Although not a defense, bottom line statistics may nevertheless be relevant in deter-
mining discriminatory intent. The court may infer purposeful discrimination from statisti-
cally significant disparate treatment of minority groups. Similarly a defendant may attemt to
deny the existence of purposeful discrimination by pointing to a nondiscriminatory bottom
line. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); United Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 432 U.S. 324 (1977).
22 See general.y Blumrosen, The Bottom Line Concept zi Equal Opportunity Law, 12 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 1 (1980); Shoben, Probing the Dirnimhnato.y Efcts of Selection Procedures with Disparate
Impact Analysis Under Title VI, 56 Tax. L. REv. 1 (1977).
23 See, e.g., EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Navajo
Ref. Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978);
Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979). But see, e.g., John-
son v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Hester v. Southern Ry.,
497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974).
24 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is an administrative
agency established by Congress to enforce title VII. Title VII requires a person allegedly
victimized by illegal employment discrimination to first exhaust existing state remedies. If
unsatisfied with the result, he may then file a complaint with the EEOC, which investigates
the claim to determine if title VII has been violated. If the agency finds probable cause that a
violation has occurred, it must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. The
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VII, decided not to prosecute employers demonstrating satisfactory bot-
tom line results.25 In 1982, however, the Supreme Court, addressing the




A. Facts and Lower Court Rulings
In Connecticut v. Teal 2 8 the plaintiffs, black employees of Connecti-
cut's Department of Income Maintenance, held positions as provisional
supervisors. To qualify for permanent positions, the plaintiffs had to
participate in a two-stage selection process. The first stage was a written
test. Only those candidates who passed the test advanced to the second
stage, in which the Department considered the candidate's "past work
performance, recommendations of the candidates' supervisors and, to a
lesser extent, seniority. '29
Eighty percent of the white candidates and fifty-four percent of the
black candidates passed the written test.30 The Teal plaintiffs failed and
therefore were not among the pool of candidates considered at the sec-
ond stage, from which the state made its promotions. The state ulti-
mately promoted twenty-three percent of the original black candidates
and fourteen percent of the original white candidates.3 1 The percentage
EEOC can file suit against the employer only after reconciliation fails. If the EEOC declines
to file suit, the aggrieved individual may file a private action. Each stage of this process has
strict limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
25 The EEOC, the Departments of Labor and Justice, and the Civil Service Commission
adpoted the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (Uniform Guidelines), 29
C.F.R. § 1607 (1978), to provide a framework for the appropriate use of selection procedures,
including tests. The guidelines state that, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the agencies
will not take enforcement action against an employer based on the disparate impact of any
component of his selection process if the total selection process, the bottom line, does not
demonstrate a disparate impact. An employee or applicant may still file an individual suit.
See supra note 24.
26 Writing in 1980, Alfred Blumrosen, a former consultant to the EEOC, argued that
the Supreme Court had already accepted the bottom line approach. Blumrosen, supra note
22. Blumrosen cited three cases to support this contention: Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,'414
U.S. 86 (1973); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); and United Steelwork-
ers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 192 (1979). However, the Court's language in the Teal deci-
sion, see infra notes 28-56 and accompanying text, makes clear that it had never accepted the
bottom line defense. See, e.g., 457 U.S. at 453.
27 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
28 Id
29 Id at 444.
30 Id at 443 n.4.
31 Id at 444. Connecticut made the promotions long after the plaintiffs had filed suit
and only one month before trial. Id at 2529. One commentator suggests that the late date of
the promotions and the plaintiffs' having served as temporary supervisors for over two years
may have influenced the Court. See Criticism of Teal "Bottom Line" Ruling, 1 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) No. 111, at 2 (Sept. 6, 1982).
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of black permanent supervisors thus exceeded the percentage of black
candidates.
The plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court, alleging that
Connecticut's selection process violated title VII as interpreted in Grzggs
v. Duke Power Co. 32; the written test had a disparate impact on black
employees seeking permanent promotion. 33 The defendants argued that
because the result of the promotion process-the "bottom line"--was
more favorable to blacks than to whites, the test did not have a dispa-
rate impact on blacks. The defendants contended that a nondiscrimina-
tory bottom line was a complete defense to the plaintiffs' suit. 34
The district court agreed with the defendants, holding that al-
though the written test had a disparate impact on blacks, 35 the defend-
ants had not violated title VII because the bottom line was equitable.36
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that because the examination denied a disproportionate
number of blacks the chance to continue in the promotion process, a
nondiscriminatory bottom line did not insulate the defendants from a
title VII claim.3 7 The court found that the plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case of disparate impact and remanded to the district court
to determine whether the written test was job related.38
B. Majority Opinion
A divided Supreme Court 39 affirmed the court of appeals. The ma-
jority, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held that the employer's non-
discriminatory bottom line did not preclude the employees from
establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact under the Court's
interpretation in Griggs of section 703(a)(2) of title VII. 40
32 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
33 The 1972 amendments to title VII extended the Act's protection to state and local
government employees. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976))
34 457 U.S. at 447 n.7.
35 The district court found, and the defendant acknowledged, that the examination re-
sulted in a disparate impact under the "80% rule" of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures adopted by the EEOC. See id at 443 n.4. This rule states that a selec-
tion rate for a group that "is less than [80%] of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded . . . as evidence of adverse impact .... ." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(1982). Here the passing rate for blacks was only 68% of the passing rate for whites. 457 U.S.
at 443; see also supra note 20.
36 The bottom line showed that a higher percentage of black applicants received a per-
manent appointment than did white applicants. See supra text accompanying note 31.
37 Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1981), aj'd, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
38 Id at 140.
39 Justices Brennan, Marshall, White, Blackmun, and Stevens voted to affirm. Chief
Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion.
40 See 457 U.S. at 451. The Court refused to place an additional burden of proof on
plaintiffs seeking to establish a prima facie case of discrimination when the defendant's bot-
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I In reaching its decision, the majority focused on the language of
section 703(a) (2), which speaks "in terms of limitations and classifations
that would deprive any individual of employment opportunities .41 From
this language, the Court concluded that even though the bottom line
approach may prevent discrimination in hiring or promotions, it does
not prevent discrimination in job opportunities. Justice Brennan
stressed that "[t]he suggestion that disparate impact should be measured
only at the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees these
individual [plaintiffs] the opportunity to compete equally with white
workers on the basis of job related criteria."42 The majority argued that
focusing exclusively on the bottom line ignores the Grzggs mandate that
section 703 (a) (2) prohibits "procedures or testing mechanisms that oper-
ate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups. '43 According to the
Court, the bottom line defense is inconsistent with Griggs because a test
at any stage of an employer's selection process that has a disparate im-
pact on blacks constitutes a "built-in headwind."44
The Court cited Congress's 1972 extension of title VII's coverage to
include state and municipal employers as support for its position.45 The
legislative history of the 1972 amendments demonstrates that Congress
agreed with the Griggs decision and intended to apply it to state and
municipal employers. 46 The majority concluded that because Griggs
had focused on "equality of opportunity and the elimination of discrimi-
natory barriers to professional development," 47 Congress, in endorsing
the decision and applying it to state and local employers, had implicitly
rejected the bottom line defense,4 8 which emphasizes equality only in
hiring and promotion. 49
tom line is nondiscriminatory, and also rejected the bottom line as an affirmative defense. Id.
at 452-54.
41 Id at 448 (emphasis in original). The Court contrasted § 703(a)(2) with § 703(a)(1),
see supra note 1, noting that § 703(a)(1), "if it were the only protection given to employees and
applicants under Title VII, might support [defendant's] exclusive focus on the overall result."
Id at 448 n.9.
42 Id at 451 (emphasis in original).
43 Id at 448-49 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
44 See id at 448.
45 See supra note 33.
46 The House and Senate Reports on the 1972 amendments to title VII cited Gniggs with
approval. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2156-57 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. This support, how-
ever, was directed at the disparate impact approach's concern with the effect of selection
devices unrelated to job performance on minority groups. See HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 18-
20; SENATE REPORT, supra, at 13-14. There is no evidence that Congress interpreted Griggs as
focusing exclusively on "opportunities," rather than jobs, as did the Teal Court. See infra note
88.
47 457 U.S. at 449 (emphasis in original).
48 Id
49 Cf id at 448 & n.9, 449 (Gnggs Court's interpretation of § 703(a)(2) undermines bot-
1983]
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The majority also relied on the Court's post-Griggs disparate impact
decisions, arguing that section 703(a)(2) as interpreted in Dothard v.
Rawlinson50 and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody51 "focuse[s] on employment
and promotion requirements that create . . . discriminatory bar[s] to
opportunities . . . [rather than] on the overall number of minority or fe-
male applicants actually hired or promoted. '52 The Court concluded
that this line of cases prohibits an employer from using a nondiscrimina-
tory bottom line as an affirmative defense if any stage of the selection
process has a disparate impact.53
Finally, the Court concluded that both the language and legislative
history of section 703 (a) (2), which emphasize the "protection of the indi-
vidual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a
whole," 54 are inconsistent with a defense that permits an employer to
discriminate against one minority group member by treating other
members of that same group favorably. 55 The Court noted that it had
previously rejected this approach in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters. 56
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Powell, in dissent, 57 countered that the majority reached a
result inconsistent with established disparate impact analysis by obscur-
ing the distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact
tom line defense by focusing on limitations that deprive individuals of employment opportu-
nities, rather than of jobs and promotions).
50 433 U.S. 321 (1977); see supra note 15.
51 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see supra note 15.
52 457 U.S. at 450. The majority argued that although the Court in Dothard "noted in
passing that women constituted 36.89 percent of the labor force and only 12.9 percent of
correctional counselor positions, [the] focus was not on this 'bottom line'. . . . [but rather] on
the disparate effect that the minimum height and weight standards had on applicants.
Id
The majority also noted that although in Albemarle Paper Co. the Court had remanded the
action to allow the defendant to prove that the tests were job related, "[the Court] did not
suggest that by promoting a sufficient number of the black employees who passed the exami-
nation, the employer could avoid this burden." Id
53 See id at 449-51.
54 Id at 453-54.
55 See id at 455.
56 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) ("A racially balanced work force cannot immunize an em-
ployer from liability for specific acts of discrimination."); see also supra note 26 (refuting one
commentator's contention that Court had already accepted bottom line defense). The major-
ity also noted similar holdings in City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978), and Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), to support
the argument that overall fairness to a minority group does not justify discriminatory treat-
ment of individual group members.
The majority, however, failed to point out that these cases all involved disparate treat-
ment claims, whereas Teal involved a disparate impact claim. The dissent argued that the
majority's use of these cases was improper and confusing. See infra notes 62-64, 72-74 and
accompanying text.
57 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined in the dissenting
opinion. 457 U.S. at 456 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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cases.58 He argued that disparate impact cases are properly concerned
with group, not individual, harm; Griggs and its progeqy considered not
"whether the claimant as an individual had been classified in a manner
impermissible under § 703(a) (2), but whether an employer's procedures
have had an adverse impact on the protected group to which the individ-
ual belongs." 59 According to the dissent, disparate impact analysis com-
pels the Court to concentrate exclusively on the effect of the employer's
"total selection process "6-the bottom line. The dissent found no dispa-
rate impact in Teal because the defendant promoted a greater percent-
age of black than white candidates.6 '
Justice Powell argued that the majority's focus on individual rights
confused the aim of title VII-to protect individual rights-with the
legal mechanisms used to achieve that aim, one of which is the disparate
impact claim.6 2 In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff attempts to
establish intentional, individual discrimination on the basis of title VII's
prescribed criteria. 63 In contrast, the plaintiff in a disparate impact case
must prove that the employer's selection process excludes a dispropor-
tionate number of the plaintiff's protected group, from which a court
can infer that plaintiff was a victim of the process's "built-in
headwinds."6 According to the dissent, the latter method of proof de-
fines the disparate impact approach; without evidence of group harm
resulting from the employer's selection process there can be no disparate
impact claims.6 5
The dissent urged that employers be allowed to rely upon a nondis-
criminatory bottom line as an affirmative defense to a disparate impact
claim. Justice Powell contended that when a plaintiff offers as proof of
discrimination a particular set of group statistics, such as the test results
in Teal, the defendant must have an opportunity to refute that evidence
by showing the selection process's overall fairness to the plaintiffs
group. 66
The dissent further contended that the cases cited by the majority
in support of its decision, Dothard v. Rawlinson67 and Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, s neither explicitly nor impliedly rejected the bottom line de-
58 Id.
59 Id at 457 (emphasis in original).
60 Id at 458 (emphasis in original).
61 See id. ; supra text accompanying note 31-34.
62 457 U.S. at 458.
63 See id; supra note 4.
64 457 U.S. at 459 (quoting Grdggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
65 Id
66 See id at 460 ("Having pleaded a disparate-impact case, the plaintiff cannot deny the
defendant the opportunity to show that there was no disparate impact.").
67 433 U.S. 321 (1977); see supra note 15.
68 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see supra note 15.
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fense.69 In Rawinson, the defendant could not rely on the bottom line
defense because the results of the hiring process reflected actual discrimi-
nation against women. 70 In Moody, the facts of the case did not present,
and the Court did not address, the bottom line defense issue. 7' The
disparate treatment cases upon which the Court relied 72 were, according
to Justice Powell, fundamentally different from disparate impact cases73
and, therefore, inapplicable to the bottom line defense issue. 74
Finally, the dissent raised concerns about the practical conse-
quences of the majority's holding in Teal. Justice Powell contended that
the decision may force employers to abandon tests entirely 75 or to use
job related tests that are expensive and difficult to develop. 76 The dis-
sent argued that employers with limited funds may choose instead to
rely on quota hiring, a practice that is both arbitrary and unlikely to
produce a competent work force.7 7 More importantly, the dissent cau-
tioned that although the bottom line approach ensures proportional mi-
nority hiring and promotion, mandating the use of job related tests
might result in fewer, rather than more, jobs and promotions for minor-
ity group members. 78
III
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court confronted the bottom line defense issue for
the first time in Connecticut v. Teal. 79 In determining the defense's valid-
ity, the Court relied on title VII's language and legislative history as
well as on earlier Supreme Court decisions interpreting the statute.
Neither source, however, provided effective support for the holding in
Teal; Congress had failed to define precisely the scope of title VII80 and
69 See 457 U.S. at 461 & n.6.
70 See supra note 52.
7t See 457 U.S. at 461 n.6; supra note 52.
72 See supra note 56.
73 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
74 See 457 U.S. at 462.
75 Id at 463. Although the Court did not discuss how Teal applies to nontest selection
devices, there is'nothing in the decision to suggest that the holding is limited to tests.
76 See id; infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
77 See 457 U.S. at 463-64; infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
78 See 457 U.S. at 464. The dissent noted that had the defendant in Teal adopted a
quota system, it could then have hired blacks only in proportion to their representation in the
ranks of provisional supervisors. Because the defendant promoted more than a proportional
number of blacks, see supra note 32 and accompanying text, under a quota system, blacks
might have attained fewer permanent supervisory positions than they actually secured under
the allegedly discriminatory selection process employed by the defendant. 457 U.S. at 463
n.8.
79 457 U.S. 440 (1982); see supra notes 28-78 and accompanying text.
80 A number of commentators have remarked that Congress, in enacting title VII, made
a broad policy statement and left the difficult decisions over the statute's precise scope and
applicability to the courts. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 60; Cooper & Sobol, Seniority
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the Court's pre-Teal decisions simply did not address the validity of the
bottom line defense.81 Thus, the Teal Court relied on narrow phrases
and semantic distinctions within the statute82 and cases of questionable
precedential value8 3 to support its conclusion that selection devices that
have a disparate impact upon a minority group may violate title VII
despite a nondiscriminatory bottom line.84 In reaching its decision in
Teal, the Court failed to conduct a thorough analysis of the statute's
underlying policies and practical effects.8 5 Such an examination reveals
that title VII is the product of a number of conflicting congressional
goals that can best be satisfied by adopting a compromise solution to the
bottom line defense issue.
The Teal majority stressed title VII's focus on equality of opportu-
nity for minority group members in the hiring and promotion process,
relying on the use of the word "opportunity" in section 703(a) (2), and
comparing that section to 703(a)(1), which stresses hiring and promo-
tion.86 The Court concluded that the bottom line defense does not en-
sure equality of opportunity and thus violates title VII.87 The legislative
history of, and 1972 amendments to, title VII, however, do not suggest
that Congress intended to distinguish between subsections 703(a) (1) and
(a) (2) based upon a greater emphasis on opportunities for minorities in
the former.8 8 Both subsections reflect congressional desire to ensure that
members of minority groups not only enjoy equal opportunity in the
hiring and promotion process, but that they also secure employment
and promotions.8 9 As the Court recognized in Griggs, "Congress di-
and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws. A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and
Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598, 1614 (1969); Rotschild & Werden, Title VII and the Use of
Employment Tests: An Illustration ofthe Limits of theJudicial Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 268
(1982).
81 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 50-53, 69-74 and accompanying text.
84 See 457 U.S. at 450-51; supra note 40 and accompanying text.
85 See The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 278, 279 (1982). This Comment
implies that blacks have a right under title VII to compete for jobs on an equal footing with
whites, but does not define equal employment opportunity. Id at 280. Thus, "equal employ-
ment opportunity" is similar to the "opportunity" that the Court stressed in Teat
86 See 457 U.S. at 448-49; supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
87 See 457 U.S. at 449; supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
88 There is virtually no legislative history relating to § 703(a)(2). See generall U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII
AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965). The only recorded remark is a statement by
Senator Ervin expressing concern that § 703(a)(2) would outlaw all tests on which whites
score higher than blacks. See 110 CONG. REc. 5614-16 (1964) (statement by Sen. Ervin). In
response, Congress enacted § 703(h), the "Tower Amendment," which allows the use of tests
having a disparate impact if they are job related. There is nothing to indicate that Congress
rejected the bottom line approach in either 1964 or 1972. See supra note 46 and accompany-
ing text (noting congressional agreement with Griggs Court's disparate impact theory).
89 See 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) ("The crux of the problem is to open employment
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them.")
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rected the thrust of [title VII] to the consequences of employment
practices. . . .90
Although the bottom line defense may be inconsistent with title
VII's concern with opportunity for individual minority group members,
it does encourage proportional representation at each employment and
promotional level. Rejection of the bottom line defense lessens the like-
lihood of proper proportional results.91
In attempting to resolve the bottom line defense issue, the Teal
Court not only interpreted title VII in a questionable manner, but also
misconstrued and misapplied past Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the statute. As the dissent argued, the majority's reliance on Dothard v.
Rawlinson92 and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Mood 93 is misplaced because
neither of these decisions addressed the bottom line defense. 94
The Teal majority also relied on past Supreme Court precedent to
support its interpretation of title VII as protecting individual, as op-
posed to group rights. The Court reasoned that the bottom line defense
does not protect individual rights because it condones discrimination
against individual minority group members at a given stage in the hir-
ing or promotion process if the end results of the process are nondiscrim-
inatory.95 Prior Supreme Court title VII decisions do not, however,
support an interpretation of the statute that focuses exclusively on indi-
vidual rights. Gn'ggs v. Duke Power Co. 96 and subsequent disparate im-
pact cases focused primarily on group harm97 and provided a group
remedy. 98 The Teal majority relied on inapplicable disparate treatment
cases to buttress its conclusion that title VII protects "individuals, not
groups, and therefore. . . the manner in which an employer has treated
other members of a group cannot defeat the claim of an individual who
has suffered as a result of even a facially neutral policy." 99 The Court
(remark by Sen. Humphrey); id at 7220 ("The rate of Negro unemployment has gone up
consistently as compared with white unemployment for the past 15 years. This is a social
malaise and a social situation which we shouli not tolerate. That is one of the principal
reasons why the bill should pass.") (remark by Sen. Clark).
90 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis in original); see supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
91 See infia note 120.
92 433 U.S. 321 (1977); see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
93 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
94 See 457 U.S. at 460-61; supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
96 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
97 See Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 62; see also supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
98 If the plaintiff in a disparate impact case prevails, the court enjoins the employer from
using the challenged selection device. To secure individual relief the plaintiff must still prove
disparate treatment. See supra note 4; see also Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 1972)
(Because the plaintiff proved discriminatory treatment, he was entitled to back pay and indi-
vidual injunctive relief unless defendant could show "by clear and convincing evidence that
he would not have been hired even absent the discriminatory testing requirement") (footnote
omitted).
99 457 U.S. at 467 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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concluded that its prior rejection in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters100
of a bottom line defense in a disparate treatment case supported the
same result in Teal, a disparate impact case.101 But as the dissent ar-
gued, the Court ignored the distinction between disparate treatment
cases, which focus on individual harm, and disparate impact cases,
which focus on group harm.10 2 The majority fails to explain why it
merges these two categories for the first time.10 3
Title VII, then, is concerned both with individual and group rights.
The bottom line defense is inconsistent with an exclusive focus on indi-
vidual rights because individuals such as the Teal plaintiffs are discrimi-
nated against regardless of the number of minority group members who
are ultimately hired or promoted. However, the bottom line defense is
consistent with a group rights approach because it encourages propor-
tional representation of minority groups in the employer's work force;
this result is less likely to occur under Teal 104
The bottom line defense issue cannot be resolved by examining the
language or legislative history of title VII or by relying on Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the statute. Title VII is the product of di-
verse congressional aims 0 5 that do not clearly support or oppose the
bottom line defense. Because the conflicting policies underlying the
statute are inadequate for evaluating the merits of the bottom line de-
fense, the Court should have considered the practical effects of its rejec-
tion of the bottom line defense in reaching its decision in Teal
An employer who previously relied on a nondiscriminatory bottom
line as protection from disparate impact claims has several options in
light of the Supreme Court's rejection of the bottom line defense in
Teal. 106 The employer can:
100 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
101 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
103 One commentator cautioned that exclusive focus on individual harm could subvert
disparate impact theory. See The Supreme Court, 1981 Tm, supra note 85, at 285 ("Relying
upon Teal, one could argue that, because title VII primarily protects individual rights, an
employment policy's disparate impact on a group should not suffice to make out a prima facie
title VII case."); see also supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
104 See infra note 120. This distinction is closely linked to the opportunity-job dichotomy
discussed above. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. A group right to actual jobs
strongly supports the bottom line defense, whereas an individual right to employment opportu-
nities is totally inconsistent with the bottom line defense.
105 Congress was not only concerned with employment discrimination against minorities,
but also with ensuring that employers would retain the freedom to hire whomever they chose,
as long as the hiring process was not discriminatory. "I would emphasize only the point that
nothing in title VII . . . tells any employer whom he may hire. What the bill does. . . is
simply to make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment." 110
CONG. RE. 13,088 (1964) (remark by Sen. Humphrey).
106 The Teal dissent posed these alternatives. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
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(1) adopt a quota selection process; 10 7
(2) adopt a totally subjective selection process that does not employ
tests or other facially neutral selection devices;
(3) use validated job related tests; 10 8 or
(4) use a facially neutral selection device as one factor in the overall
selection process, but not as a complete obstacle to further con-
sideration of applicants who fail.109
The consequences of each alternative are to some extent contrary to the
aims of title VII.
The Teal decision may encourage the adoption of quota hiring and
promotion schemes. 1"0 Employers who are unwilling or unable to de-
velop job related tests may establish quotas to avoid disparate impact
claims.' Quota selection, however, is contrary to both congressional
intent"1 2 and title VII's concern with equal employment opportunity
because under such a plan minority group members do not compete
equally with others but instead compete among themselves for a prede-
termined number of positions.
Other employers may adopt a selection process that subjectively
evaluates each applicant's ability to perform the job. This approach
appears to provide equal opportunity to minority group members be-
cause all applicants are judged according to the same criteria. Em-
ployer bias against minorities, however, may influence hiring or
promotion, and without a facially neutral selection device, rejected
107 The bottom line defense is similar to a "pure" quota system because it ensures that a
certain percentage of the members of a protected group will be hired or promoted. In a
"pure" quota system, the employer is primarily concerned with hiring a certain percentage of
minorities and only secondarily concerned with their qualifications. Under the bottom line
approach, on the other hand, the employer first requires the employee to exhibit a relevant
qualification by passing a test or succeeding with respect to another selection device. Thus
under the bottom line approach, the applicant's qualifications are of primary concern and
only qualified applicants, minority and nonminority, are selected. Because the minority
members selected have demonstrated the same qualifications as the selected nonminority ap-
plicants, the bottom line approach is less likely to stigmatize minority employees than a
"pure" quota system.
108 A validated test is one that the employer has examined in terms of its job relatedness.
See inrja note 117.
109 See 457 U.S. at 463 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1 10 The dissent in Teal expressed this concern. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
III If a selection process reveals no barrier to minority employment or promotion, dispa-
rate impact can only be measured at the end of the process. A quota system ensures that each
group attains a proportional number of positions. One commentator suggests that quota
hiring may be illegal in light of the Supreme Court's decision in University of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978); see The Supreme Court, 1981 Tem, supra note 85, at 282 n.29. Under
Bakke, however, race can be a factor, as long as it is not the major determinant of selection.
Employers now may be able to avoid findings of illegality by simply disguising their quota
selection.
112 See, e.g., 110 CONG. Rc. 13,080 (1964) (remark by Sen. Clark); id at 9881-82 (remark
by Sen. Allott); id at 8921 (remark by Sen. Williams).
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applicants cannot make out disparate impact claims."13 In contrast to
the bottom line approach, subjective selection processes do not en-
courage employers to make affirmative efforts to hire minority group
members. 114
The third alternative for employers is the use of job related tests.
Job related tests that have a disparate impact on protected minority
groups are nonetheless immune from title VII claims. 15 To determine
if a test is job related, courts generally refer to the Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures (Uniform Guidelines) 116 and require
that a validation study be done according to professional standards."17
It may, however, be difficult for employers to validate tests because the
Uniform Guidelines are difficult and expensive to follow. 81 Further-
113 Applicants may, of course, attempt to prove disparate treatment. See supra note 5.
114 An employer using job related tests is immune from disparate impact claims, and thus
the percentage of minorities he hires or promotes is legally insignificant. Under the bottom
line approach, however, an employer who fails to hire a proportional number of minorities
may be subject to disparate impact claims.
115 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 25. According to the G-rggs Court the EEOC guidelines represent
"[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency," and are therefore
"entitled to great deference." 401 U.S. at 433-34.
117 The Uniform Guidelines recognize three statistical methods of validating the job re-
latedness of a selection device. The most common technique is "criterion-related validation,"
which assesses the statistical relationship between the selection device and some significant
measure of job performance. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R. at § 1607.5(B). There are two forms of criterion related validation. The predictive
form, in which the employer gives tests to new employees and compares the results to subse-
quent job performance, and the concurrent form in which the employer gives tests to present
employees and compares the results with the job performance measuring device. Id The
second technique is "content-validation," in which the employer compares the skill measured
by the selection device with that necessary for the job. Id For example, a typing test for
secretarial applicants is content validated. The final technique, rarely used, is "construct-
validation," in which an employer identifies a characteristic thought essential to job success,
such as verbal acuity for a salesman, and accurately measures that characteristic with the
selection device. Id
All three techniques require the employer to carefully describe the predictor and the job
and to examine the test for potential bias. The Uniform Guidelines demand a high degree of
statistical correlation between the predictor and actual job performance before a test will be
considered job related. See id at § 1607.14(B) (criterion-related validation). Cf W. CON-
NOLLY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 86-91 (1975) (suggesting that testing
is one means of selecting employees to ensure efficient work force and arguing that testing
practices are irrelevant if employer is meeting affirmative action goals). See generally 3 A.
LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 17, at § 65.00 (describing the three techniques of
validation).
118 A recent report by the General Accounting Office concluded that the Uniform Guide-
lines are (1) inconsistent with professionally accepted methods of demonstrating job related-
ness; and (2) so difficult to read and to comply with that employers find it virtually impossible
to satisfy the obligations imposed on them. The report called for a revision of the Guidelines.
See EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) Last Report Letter No. 45 (Sept. 21, 1982). Seegenerally 3 A.
LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 17, at § 65.00; B. SCI-ILEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at
102-03 (main vol. 1976); A. SMITH, C. CRAVER & L. CLARK, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 803 (1982).
The complexity of the Uniform Guidelines is one reason the EEOC adopted the bottom
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:735
more, some experts believe that virtually no tests conform to the Uni-
form Guidelines' standards.' 19 Finally, it is unclear whether employers'
efforts to validate tests, even if successful, will benefit minority group
members either in terms of jobs or opportunities.1 20
Despite the Court's rejection of the bottom line defense in Teal,
employers may continue using discriminatory selection devices by inte-
grating test results into a one-step hiring decision rather than using the
test as an absolute barrier to applicants who fail. 12 1 Plaintiffs will suc-
ceed in raising disparate impact claims only if the employer's total selec-
tion process is discriminatory because the test's effect on minorities can
be measured only at the end of the hiring or promotion process. 122 Em-
ployers will, in effect, be able to continue to rely on the bottom line
defense thus undermining title VII's protection of individual rights and
opportunities. If the minority group as a whole is treated well, individ-
ual group members remain at a competitive disadvantage in the selec-
tion process because of the use of discriminatory tests.
IV
PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court's rejection of the bottom line defense in Connect-
icut v. Teal 123 not only contravenes several of the policies underlying title
VII, 1 24 but may also allow employers to continue to use discriminatory
line approach. See Tranraipt, EEOC Commissioners'Meeting, Dec. 22, 1977, 43 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) E-l-4 (19 78);see also B. SCILEI & P. GROSSMAN,Supra note 16, at 34 n.25 (Supp. 1979)
("The EEOC appears anxious to encourage employers to focus upon the 'bottom line' selec-
tion percentages in an effort to persuade the employer to maintain selection ratios that elimi-
nate the need for embarking upon extensive validation programs to justify the ostensible
underrepresentation of minorities or females.").
119 See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv., 630 F.2d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 1980) (expert testi-
mony concluding "that there is no test that can be considered completely valid to select can-
didates for any but the most rudimentary tasks") cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981)).
120 An employer can use a test having a disparate effect on minorities if it is job related.
Blacks do not generally do as well on written tests as whites due to test bias and educational
disadvantage. See, e.g., L. TYLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN DIFFERENCES 315 (3d ed.
1965); American Psychological Ass'n, Task Force on Employment Testing of Minority
Groups, Job Testing and the Disadvantaged, 24 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 637 (1969); Cooper & Sobol,
supra note 80, at 1638-41. Therefore, if employers use job related tests to screen applicants,
fewer blacks will be hired or promoted than under the bottom line approach, which assures
proportional representation in the employer's work force.
The President of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, an employer advocacy
group, speculates that "[g]iven the limited funds available to all employers, it is quite possible
that funds which might otherwise have gone to training, recruitment, or other efforts to em-
ploy additional miniroties [sic] and females, or to upgrade their job related skills, will be
shifted to test validation efforts." 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 3 (Sept. 6, 1982) (comment on
practical effect of Teal).
121 See 457 U.S. at 463 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).
122 See suira note 111.
123 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
124 See subra notes 89-104 and accompanying text.
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selection devices.125 An absolute bottom line defense is also inconsistent
with title VII because it fails to protect individual rights and ensure
equal opportunity. 26 An intermediate approach reflecting a compro-
mise between complete acceptance or rejection of the bottom line de-
fense can best effectuate title VII's goals in a manner consistent with
Teal.
This "modified bottom line defense" would apply in situations in
which: (1) the plaintiff demonstrates that the employer's selection de-
vice results in a disparate impact on a protected group; and (2) the em-
ployer shows a nondiscriminatory bottom line. Under the bottom line
defense rejected in Teal, the employer's selection device would be upheld
despite its disparate impact, because of the nondiscriminatory results of
the total hiring process. Under Teal, the employer's nondiscriminatory
bottom line does not immunize him from disparate impact claims unless
he demonstrates the job relatedness of the selection device.
Under the modified bottom line defense, if the plaintiff establishes
a prima facie showing of disparate impact and the defendant demon-
strates a nondiscriminatory bottom line, the court should apply a slid-
ing-scale test to determine if the equality of jobs reflected by that
bottom line outweighs the inequality of opportunity resulting from the
disparate impact. This test should consider such factors as the severity
of the disparate effect on the protected group and the availability of less
discriminatory selection devices. Thus, a court should be more hesitant
to accept a test that blacks pass half as often as whites than one that
blacks pass four-fifths as often as whites. If a test has an extreme dispa-
rate impact, even a nondiscriminatory bottom line will not insulate the
employer from claims of discrimination. This approach allows the court
to consider directly the exact level of inequality of opportunity: the
level of the disparate impact.' 27
A court should also consider the availability of less discriminatory
selection devices in applying this sliding-scale test. The employer must
show that he made a reasonable effort to find a less discriminatory selec-
tion device. 128 If an employer uses a test known to disadvantage minor-
ity groups and does not actively search for a less discriminatory
125 Ste supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 89, 93 and accompanying text.
127 A court also should consider whether the employer knew, or should have known, that
the test would probably produce a disparate impact on a protected class. If the employer was
aware of this, the inequality of the opportunity is less acceptable than if the employer had no
knowledge of the test's discriminatory impact. For example, evidence that blacks score worse
than whites on generalized intelligence tests, see supra note 120, should place employers using
such tests under a heavy burden of proving that equality ofjobs outweighs this inequality of
opportunity.
128 The Uniform Guidelines require employers to use reasonable efforts to find less dis-




alternative, the modified bottom line defense will not protect him from
disparate impact claims. This step imposes on employers an affirmative
obligation to pursue equal employment opportunity.
The plaintiff can rebut the defendant's showing by demonstrating
the availability of a less discriminatory selection device that adequately
serves the employer's need for a qualified work force. Thus, on the facts
of Teal, the plaintiffs might prevail by arguing that their two years of
experience as provisional supervisors 129 gave the employer the opportu-
nity to select the most qualified workers for promotion without relying
on the results of a discriminatory test.' 30
Even if the employer demonstrates that the equality of jobs offered
by a nondiscriminatory bottom line outweighs the inequality of oppor-
tunity resulting from the disparate impact, he must still prove a reason-
able connection between the selection device and job performance to
prevail under the modified bottom line rule.13 1 Teal mandates this in-
quiry into job relatedness. 32 A test, however, may bear a substantial
relationship to job performance yet not comply with Uniform Guideline
standards. 133 If the employer demonstrates that his selection device re-
sults in a bottom line that indicates equality of jobs that significantly
outweighs any disparate impact, a court should apply a less stringent
standard of job relatedness than if the employer did not have a satisfac-
tory bottom line. In determining job relatedness, a court should inquire
whether the test selects applicants who are more qualified than those it
rejects. This standard should be implemented by referring to the Uni-
form Guidelines, without applying them rigidly.
Ultimately, the modified bottom line defense is more consistent
with title VII's aims than is the Teal decision or the pure bottom line
defense. Under this approach, if an employer demonstrates equality of
jobs through a nondiscriminatory bottom line, a court will permit a
greater, although not unlimited, degree of inequality of opportunity.
Because the employer must attempt to implement the least discrimina-
tory yet reasonable selection device, the modified bottom line defense
furthers title VII's goals of ensuring employment opportunity and pro-
129 See supra note 31.
130 Connecticut could have used job performance evaluations, or other subjective crite-
ria, based on the quality of the provisional supervisors' work.
131 Commenting on the Teal decision, Alfred Blumrosen suggested "a 'rational relation-
ship' standard should 'be applied in the absence of overall adverse impact." See Ctidsrm of
Teal 'Bottom Line'Ruling, 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 1, 2 (1982). The modified bottom line
defense proposed in this Note differs from Blumrosen's suggestion in requiring the employer
to go beyond the nondiscriminatory bottom line and actually prove that the equality of jobs
outweighs the disparate impact's inequality of opportunity.
132 Teal holds that an employer must demonstrate the job relatedness of a selection de-
vice having disparate impact, notwithstanding a nondiscriminatory bottom line. 102 S. Ct. at
2533.
133 See supra note 118.
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tecting individual rights to a greater extent than does an absolute bot-
tom line defense.1 34 In addition, because an employer relying on this
modified defense will have a nondiscriminatory bottom line, title VII's
aim of supplying jobs and protecting group rights is more readily
achieved than under Teal.
The courts or the EEOC can develop this modified bottom line de-
fense and still remain consistent with Teal. The Supreme Court re-
manded Teal to allow the lower court to determine if the test in question
was job related. 135 Under Teal the court could apply a less stringent
standard of job relatedness if the defendant meets the elements of the
modified bottom line defense.' 36 Alternatively, the EEOC could amend
the Uniform Guidelines to apply a looser standard of job relatedness in
such cases.' 37
David N Yellen
134 If the bottom line defense is valid, an employer has no incentive to adopt nondiscrimi-
natory selection devices; as long as the employer can show a fair bottom line, he is insulated
from disparate impact claims.
135 457 U.S. at 456.
136 Teal does not discuss the requirements of job relatedness, holding only that the bot-
tom line defense cannot defeat disparate impact claims. One commentator has observed that
in the aftermath of Teal, courts supportive of the bottom line defense may "be more inclined
to find tests to be properly validated and lawful in instances where the employer's 'bottom
line' is nondiscriminatory." 111 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 1, 3 (1982). The modified bottom
line defense is superior to this ad hoc approach because it forces courts to balance the bottom
line's equality of jobs and the disparate impact's inequality of opportunity before applying a
reduced standard of job relatedness.
137 In GCggs, the Court held that the EEOC's guidelines are "entitled to great defer-
ence." 401 U.S. at 434. Thus, the Court should uphold the modified bottom line defense if
the EEOC adopts it.

